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'LESSER EVILS' IN TIE WAR ON TERRORISM'

Mark A. Drumblt
Today's panel dichotomizes the use of force (i.e. the deployment of
military means) and the use of courts (i.e. the deployment of the criminal
law). To be sure, there are important conceptual differences between
constructing terrorist attacks as crimes or as armed attacks. However, it is
possible to respond to criminal attacks through the use of both courts and
force (for example, force can be used to locate and obtain custody over
suspected terrorists and incapacitate those who resist), and to armed attacks
through both courts and force (for example, courts can be used to prosecute
terrorist combatants who flout the laws of war).
Accordingly,
conceptualizing the use of force and the use of courts as mutually exclusive
response mechanisms builds somewhat of a false dichotomy. In fact, this is
but one of three false dichotomies bouncing around the popular rhetoric and
public policy that currently animate efforts to contain and eradicate terrorist
violence. The other two are civil liberties versus national security and
dissensus versus direction.
If we assume there to be a war on terror'-as the U.S. Supreme Court
has-we must also recognize that this war should be waged in the name of
law, not against law. Victory certainly is the objective, but how victory is
achieved also is crucial-especially for a war deemed to be just to remain
just. As an aside, it is important to underscore that, although law is not as
blunt a form of violence as is the use of military force, law and courts do
represent the institutionalization and legitimization of coercion by the state
or, increasingly, by international legal institutions.
Let us not
underestimate the force of the criminal law to neutralize, deter, punish, and
stigmatize. Terrorism is an illegitimate use of force, but it also is a crime,
and there are many compelling reasons for casting it as such in full
complement to availing ourselves of military means to combat it when
these are necessary in self-defense, or authorized by the United Nations
* Presented at the War Crimes Research Symposium: "Terrorism on Trial" at Case

Western Reserve University School of Law, sponsored by the Frederick K. Cox International
Law Center, on Friday, October 8, 2004.
t Associate Professor and Ethan Allen Faculty Fellow, School of Law, Washington & Lee
University.
But see STEFAN HALPER & JONATHAN CLARKE, AMERICA ALONE 274-301 (2004)

(voicing skepticism whether the war on terror is or can be a war at all and instead
characterizing it as a more discrete "problem management issue"); Bruce Ackerman, Don't
Panic,LONDON REv. BOOKS, Feb. 7, 2002, at 15, 16 (describing the language of the "war on
terrorism" as an "extravagant metaphor blocking responsible thought about a serious
problem").
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Security Council, or required to track down and incapacitate terrorist war
criminals.
Regardless, the current debate places law and force in opposition to
each other. According to this binary-and mutually exclusive-worldview, states can conduct the war on terror in multiple theaters of operation
as either a criminal investigation or as an armed conflict. In some quarters,
largely populated by purists, humanists, perfectionists, human rights
entrepreneurs, civil libertarians and, of course, many lawyers, law is viewed
as an absolute, as a prerequisite to peace, and as reflective of our humanity.
This community should honestly admit that it may at times overestimate the
value of law in deterring suicide-bombers and neutralizing their threats.
Moreover, this community may underestimate the terrorists' ability to
exploit law and find safety in its cracks, crevices, protections, and nuances.
An opposite-although equally reductionist-approach has been
encouraged by many governments and broad swaths of people, including
the occasional lawyer. This is a view that seeks to minimize the role of law
in the war on terror. It constructs law as something cloying and annoying.2
It posits a barbarians at the gate scenario in which the cities on the hills are
ill-served by rules, regulations, or restraint. 3 This alarming scenario
assumes that the national security threats we face today are graver than
threats we-or the civilized world as a whole-have faced before, thereby
occasioning a possible under appreciation of our shared history and the
major threats we have survived, resisted, and overcome in the past. The
governments of the U.S., U.K., and Russian Federation, to varying extents
inter se, have tended toward this end of the spectrum. The Bush
Administration, for its part, has categorized terrorist attacks as armed
attacks instead of criminal attacks, but then has cast international
humanitarian law-which customarily governs the conduct of belligerents
in armed conflict-as "quaint" and something to be circumscribed in
conducting the war on terror. 4 From this perspective, too much law2 See Neil A. Lewis & Eric Schmitt, Lawyers DecidedBans on Torture Didn't Bind Bush,
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2004, at Al (stating that after the September 11 terrorist attacks the
administration's lawyers "were set to work to find legal arguments to avoid restrictions
imposed by international and American law").
3 Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARv. INT'L L. J. 23, 23 (2002) ("I have
been struck by how many Americans - and how many lawyers - seem to have concluded
that, somehow, the destruction of four planes and three buildings has taken us back to a state
of nature in which there are no laws or rules.").
4 Pete Yost, Did Administration Construct Legal Foundation Clearing Way for Abuse

Scandal?, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., May 16, 2004, available at http://www.signonsandiego.

com/news/world/iraq/20040516-2254-us-prisonerabuse.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2005)
(reporting correspondence from White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales to President Bush
in which Mr. Gonzales stated that the "new paradigm" occasioned by the fight against
terrorism "renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners
and renders quaint some of its provisions").
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namely, too deep an entanglement in the web of legalism and legalese-is
dangerous insofar as it threatens U.S. national security interests.
This skepticism to law manifests itself in four important U.S. policy
initiatives.
(1) Guanttinamo. Roughly 550 foreign nationals have remained
detained at the U.S. military base on Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba for nearly
three years already. They have not faced formal legal process. The U.S.
government largely has thwarted meaningful public determination of their
status as prisoners-of-war or unlawful combatants by a competent tribunal
as envisioned by the Geneva Conventions.5 It has restricted detainees from
substantive access to lawyers to learn of the charges they face or the
grounds for their detention (thereby obscuring whether this detention is in
fact preventative or punitive). Guantfnamo-isolated, shorn of process,
access, and transparency-sits as a stark metaphor of the perceptions
among certain influential actors of the crimped role law should play in the
war on terror 6 and, in turn, a site of resistance for other important actors,
including the United States Supreme Court-to which I will return in
greater detail later. 7 Many experts agree that the detentions, as well as
interrogation methods deployed against the detainees, run afoul of
international humanitarian law and international human rights law.

5 See infra note 33 for a discussion of the combatant status review panels implemented in
the summer of 2004 and conclusions regarding their falling short of the Geneva Convention
requirements.
6 See Richard J. Goldstone, InternationalHuman Rights and CriminalJustice in the First
Decade of the 21st Century, 11 HuM. RTs. BRIEF 3, 4-5 (2004).
7 See discussion infra notes 32-33.
8 Neil A. Lewis, Guantdnamo Inmate Complains of Threats and Long Isolation, N.Y.

TIMEs, Aug. 7, 2004 at A9 (stating that "[w]hile the United States government has asserted
no obligation to give the GuantAnamo prisoners the protections of the Geneva Conventions,"
but officials have insisted that they "have done so as a humanitarian gesture"); see also
Diane Marie Amann, Guantinamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 319-348 (2004)
(concluding that many of the substantive protections of the Geneva Conventions do not
appear to be applied to these detainees); Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in Our
Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries of the International
Legal Order, 81 N. C. L. REv. 1, 10 (2002); Dave Moniz, U.S. Missed Chances to Stop
Abuses, USA TODAY, May 18, 2004, at A4 (reporting that in May 2003 "eight high-ranking
military lawyers voiced concerns to Pentagon officials and the New York State Bar
Association that new interrogation policies developed after the Sept. 11 attacks could lead to
prisoner abuses" and that these policies "might 'reverse 50 years of a proud tradition of
compliance with the Geneva Conventions"'); Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee
Abuse in Guantdnamo, N.Y. TIMEs (Nov. 30, 2004) (reporting that the International
Committee of the Red Cross has charged that the U.S. military has used psychological and
physical coercion "tantamount to torture" on prisoners at GuantAnamo).
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(2) U.S. citizen enemy combatants. The White House has claimed that
it has the unilateral ability to declare a U.S. citizen an enemy combatant and
then deny that individual access to any form of legal process to contest the
indefinite detention that might result. 9 This, too, has been contested by the
judicial branch.' 0
(3) Military commissions. A select number of Guantdtnamo detainees
face prosecution on terrorism and war crimes related charges in specially
created military commissions designed to prosecute foreign nationals.'
Pretrial proceedings have begun against certain detainees but remain mired
in controversy and fraught by challenge.12 That said, the decision to create
these commissions and the nature of the proposal reflect a calculus to cut
out the ordinary federal courts and substitute those institutions and
processes with a methodology that restrains due process rights in the name
of national security.
(4) Insulating the Executive branch from judicial review and
accountability. White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales advised the White
House that declaring that Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees were not covered
by the Geneva Conventions "substantially reduces" the threat of criminal
prosecution for war crimes (defined to include any grave breach of the
Geneva Conventions) under domestic U.S. law.' 3 Secretary of State Colin
Powell submitted a sharp critique of this recommendation.' 4 The President
followed suit by stating that Taliban detainees were entitled to the coverage
9 Anthony Lewis, A PresidentBeyond the Law, N.Y. TIMEs, May 7, 2004, at A3 1.

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004) (holding that due process
demands that a U.S. citizen held in the U.S. as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful
opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decision-maker).
10

1 Scott Higham, Bin Laden Aide is Charged at First Tribunal, WASH. POST, Aug. 24,
2004, at Al.
12 Neil A. Lewis, Guantdnamo TribunalProcess in Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2004,
§1, at 29.
13 Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales, to the President, Decision re Application of the
Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan.
25, 2002) (on file with the author); see also John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture,
NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4989481 (last visited Feb.
28, 2005); Michael Isikoff, Memos Reveal War Crimes Warnings, NEWSWEEK, May 17,
2004, available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4999734/site/newsweek/ (reporting that "the
internal memos show that administration lawyers were privately concerned that they could
[be] tried for war crimes themselves based on actions the administration were [sic] taking").
14 See Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, to Counsel to the President, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on
the Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 26, 2002)
(on file with author).
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of the Geneva Conventions whereas al-Qaeda fighters were not; however,
he then denied actual prisoner of war status to all detainees. 15 This created
a situation in which military personnel felt able to use interrogation
methods that were more coercive in nature than those habitually permitted.
In a different vein, U.S. officials have stated that the Administration "has
decided to take the unusual step of bestowing on its own troops and
personnel immunity from prosecution by Iraqi courts for killing Iraqis or
destroying local property after the occupation
ends and political power is
16
transferred to an interim Iraqi government.'
Skepticism about the role of law also animated the now disavowed,
and infamous, torture memoranda. 17 There is cause to believe that these
15Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: Captives; In Shift, Bush Says Geneva Rules
Fit Taliban Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at AI; Paul Koring, No PoWs Being Held in
Cuba, Bush Says, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 8, 2002, at A12.
16Robin Wright, U.S. Immunity in Iraq Will Go Beyond June 30, WASH. POST, June 24,
2004, at AOl.
17 See Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global
War on Terrorism:
Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations (Mar. 6, 2003),
available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/military_0604.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Working Group Report] (classified draft document made
publicly available by the Wall Street Journal). The Working Group Report advised that the
President was not bound by an international treaty prohibiting torture or by federal antitorture legislation owing to his authority as commander-in-chief to approve any technique
needed to protect U.S. security and, furthermore, that any executive branch official could be
immune from domestic and international prohibitions against torture. Id. at 20-22.
Moreover, the Working Group Report defined torture narrowly, concluding that an
interrogator who knows that severe pain will result from his actions lacks the requisite
specific intent to torture even if he acted in bad faith so long as causing this pain was not his
objective. Id. at 7-9. The Working Group Report drew heavily from an August 1, 2002
memorandum that argued that the President's wartime powers superceded anti-torture laws
and treaties. See Dana Priest, Justice Dept. Memo Says Torture 'May be Justified', WASH.
POST, June 13, 2004 (stating that the August 1, 2002 memorandum was signed by former
Assistant Attorney-General Jay Bybee, who is currently a judge on the Ninth Circuit). This
August 1, 2002 memorandum, in turn, derives from earlier documentation, including a
memorandum of Jan. 9, 2002. Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, and Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of
Justice, to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, Application of
Treaties and Laws to al-Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002), available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5025040/site/newsweek (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). The
August 1, 2002 memorandum generated harsh criticism insofar as it appeared to justify the
use of torture (stopping just short of death) in the war on terror and to immunize personnel
committing torture from legal process. See Michael Ignatieff, Mirage in the Desert, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., June 27, 2004, at 1 (describing the memorandum, and other work product, as
giving new meaning to the phase 'savage servility.'). As a consequence of this controversy,
the Justice Department eventually disavowed this memorandum. Bush Claimed Right to
Waive PrisonerAbuse Laws, GLOBE & MAIL, June 22, 2004; David Johnston, Uncertainty
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memoranda, along with other deliberate decisions made at senior levels to
circumscribe the role of law, had an impact upon the degree of respect for
9
law in the Abu Ghraib prison' 8 (along with prisons in Afghanistan)' and,
therefore, may well have contoured the sadistic environment and abusive
conduct that took place in both locations. Independent and Army inquiries
into the prison abuses suggest that senior officials, while not personally
2°
culpable, are to be faulted for failing to exercise proper oversight.
Moreover, there is evidence that abuses by U.S. forces took place in a
number of locations throughout Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention
Guantdnamo as well, disconcertingly sug§esting that the "few bad apples"
theory might not be too factually accurate.

About Interrogation Rules Seen as Slowing the Hunt for Information on Terrorists, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2004, at 8.
18See, e.g., Scott Higham & Joe Stephens, New Details of Prison Abuse Emerge, WASH.
POST, May 21, 2004, at A01 (reporting investigations of allegations at Abu Ghraib of savage
beatings, prisoners being forced to retrieve food from toilets, sexual molestation, forcefeeding of pork and liquor to Muslim prisoners, forcing prisoners to bark like dogs, riding
prisoners like animals, forced masturbation, rape, and sodomy).
19 There are reports of significant human rights violations, including assault with intent to
cause death and serious bodily harm, by U.S. forces in prisons in Afghanistan. Eric Schmitt,
3 Commandos Charged With Beating of Prisoners,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2004, at 7.
20 The Church Report (a naval inspector general inquiry) faulted senior U.S. officials for
failing to establish clear interrogation policies for Iraq and Afghanistan, but also found that
senior officials were not directly responsible for the abuses and that there was no policy that
approved mistreatment of detainees. Eric Schmitt, New Interrogation Rules Set for
Detainees in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (March 10, 2005) (reporting also that the Army had taken
action against 109 soldiers, including 32 courts-martial). The Fay Report (an Army inquiry)
found that senior U.S. commanders created conditions that allowed abuses to occur at Abu
Ghraib when they failed to provide the leadership and resources required to administer the
prison. Thom Shanker & Kate Zemike, Abuse Inquiry Faults Officers on Leadership,N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 19, 2004, at Al. The Fay Report found no evidence of culpability above the
colonel who commanded the military intelligence unit in the prison. Id. Classified sections
of the Fay Report state that the head commander in Iraq, Gen. Sanchez, sowed such
confusion among interrogators in Iraq that they acted in ways that violated the Geneva
Conventions, which in any regard they understood poorly anyway. Douglas Jehl & Eric
Schmitt, Army's Report Faults General in Prison Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2004, at Al.
The Schlesinger Report (an independent inquiry) found that top Pentagon civilian and
military leaders allowed conditions that led to the abuse of detainees in Abu Ghraib. Bradley
Graham & Josh White, Top PentagonLeaders Faulted in Prison Abuse, WASH. POST, Aug.
25, 2004, at Al; see also R. Jeffrey Smith, Documents Helped Sow Abuse, Army Report
Finds, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2004, at A01 (discussing documents written by senior officials
that Army officials say helped sow the seeds of prison abuse in Iraq).
21 Barton Gellman and R. Jeffrey Smith, Report to Defense Alleged Abuse by Prison
Interrogation Teams, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2004); Josh White, U.S. Generals in Iraq Were
Told ofAbuse Early, Inquiry Finds,WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2004).
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To be sure, the Bush Administration does not wholly dismiss the role
of regular courts in the war on terror. In fact, there has been some use of the
ordinary criminal law and process to host a number of terrorism related
prosecutions-most prominently Walker Lindh and Moussaoui.22 These
have occurred in U.S. court. However, even in each of these prosecutions,
the ordinary role of rule of law and due process has been curtailed, often
rather extensively. The push to convict has led to the subsequent
unraveling of some prosecutions.23 Attempts by other nations, for example
Germany, to prosecute terrorist defendants have been undermined by due
process concerns owing to U.S. refusal to permit those defendants to call
relevant witnesses from detention at Guantdnamo. The Department of
Justice has asserted vigorous use of material witness warrants in terrorism
investigations that far transcends the intended purpose of such warrants.24
All in all, "[d]espite the 9/11 commission's remarkable exercise in public
education, the government is still trying to make the war on terror ever
more secret., 25 Some may say that secrecy is a necessity-or at least an
inevitability-in the struggle against a shadowy, deadly, and shifty enemy
that itself knows no regard for law or humanity. Others may intone that
secrecy is not an inevitability, nor our destiny, but simply an ideological
preference.
One of law's most precious qualities is its public nature. Assuredly,
there are situations where the public nature of the law could undermine the
common good, for example through the dissemination of national security
secrets. This has been one argument cited in favor of military commissions
instead of criminal trials for alleged terrorist fighters. That said, there is an
important role for public process in a democracy. I am guided in this
regard by philosopher Michael Ignatieff, who argues that in combating the

22 Two hundred and eighty four persons have been charged with "terrorism crimes" in
U.S. courts. See Comments of Larry Thompson, to the Panel on Terrorism and Civil
Liberties, Southeastern Association of American Law Schools Conference (Aug. 3, 2004)
(notes on file with the author). There have been 152 pleas. Id. There have been some
convictions and some acquittals. Id. Although the definition of "terrorism crime" is very
broad, the point remains that the U.S. has not fully disengaged domestic courts as
mechanisms to fight terrorism.
23 Danny Hakim & Eric Lichtblau, After Convictions, the Undoing of a U.S. Terror

Prosecution,N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 7, 2004, at 1.
24 Ricardo J. Bascuas, The Unconstitutionality of "Hold Until Cleared":
Reexamining
Material Witness Detentions in the Wake of the September 11 Dragnet, VAND. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2005).
25 Michael Ignatieff, Lesser Evils, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 2, 2004, at 7 (referring to the
government's refusal to disclose how many times it has used its expanded authority under
the Patriot Act and to disclose name of detainees), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.
edu/news/opeds/2004/ignatieff lessevils_nytm_050204.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
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evil of terrorism we must follow the course of the "lesser evil." 26 Although
democracies must defend themselves-after all, "liberal states cannot be
protected by herbivores" 27-they must not panic. They can circumscribe
some of the freedoms they are fighting for, but this circumscription always
must be strictly targeted and sharply tailored in a manner that minimally
impairs those same freedoms. Ignatieff argues that,
the use of coercive force in a liberal democracy, not just in times of
emergency, but in normal times as well, is regarded as a lesser evil. This
particular view of democracy does not prohibit emergency suspensions of
rights in times of terror. But it imposes an obligation on government to
justify such measures publicly, to submit them to judicial review, and to
circumscribe28 them with sunset clauses so that they do not become
permanent.

Ignatieff's shorthand for this obligation is "open adversarial review,"
or a "duty of adversarial justification," in which governments must justify
the steps they take in public before legislatures, courts, and public
opinion.2 9 This process should be subject to what Ignatieff calls the
"conservative test," namely, "are departures from existing due process
standards really necessary?" 30 For Ignatieff, "democracy depends on
distrust,... freedom's defense31requires submitting even noble intentions to
the test of adversarial review."

26

See generally MICHAEL

IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLMCAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF

TERROR (2004).
27 IGNATIEFF, supra note 26, at 12. Those who strictly adumbrate non-violence in the face

of violence may be faulted for their passivity and the immediate social cost of their vision.
Margaret MacMillan, Terrorism: The DemocraticDilemma, GLOBE & MAIL, May 8, 2004, at
D6 (describing Gandhi as stating that violence is never justified and reporting that Gandhi
"famously urged the British to let the Japanese invade India; in times his non-violence would
change the invaders' hearts.").
28 IGNATIEFF, supra note 26, at vii-viii.
29 Id. at 24, 51. To this I would add that duties of review or justification can be exercised
within the government by virtue of inter-agency discussion and collaboration. That said, in
the formulation of the military commissions it appears that certain branches of government,
in particular the State Department, were cut out of the decision-making process, thereby
hamstringing deliberative discussions within the government in the name of direction over
dissensus. Tim Golden, After Terror, a Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
24, 2004).
30 IGNATIEFF, supra note 26, at 24 (emphasis omitted). Ignatieff posits certain deprivations
as beyond the pale and not subject to justification as lesser evils. These include torture,
targeted assassinations, and indefinite suspension of habeas corpus. See id. at viii, 24, 118.
3 Id. at 119.
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The importance Ignatieff accords to the duty of adversarial
justification leads to the troubling false dichotomy between direction and
dissensus. This dichotomy emerges most apparently in the notion that the
courts should show deference to the President in times of war. With the
nation at war, do we have the time to engage in messy, contrarian, timeconsuming, and hairsplitting civil dissensus-in which policies are hashed
through, often frustratingly, in painstaking detail? Do we instead need the
direct, bright-line thinking that can best emerge from the office of the
executive, especially in the delicate matters of foreign policy and national
security? Should we judge early based on fears or slowly based on
knowledge? Should we defer to top-down cues or come to independent
bottom-up conclusions? In considering these questions, we must be
mindful of history, which teaches us that humanity has long faced nihilistic
threats of dismemberment and destruction. We are not the first generation
to face such threats-many others have faced devastating violence-and we
need to recognize this as we prepare our responses to the nihilistic
challenges of today. History teaches us that there is considerable value in
ensuring that derogations of the ordinary remain measured instead of
impetuous.
In a brief filed in the DC Circuit in Al Odah, a separate case eventually
consolidated before the Supreme Court, the U.S. argued that the scope of
any rights of aliens detained abroad are to be determined by the executive
and the military, not the courts. It took a similar approach before the
Supreme Court in Hamdi32 and Rasul,33 pleading in argument that it was the

32 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004) (holding that due process demands
that a U.S. citizen held in the U.S. as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful
opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decision-maker).
33 Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698 (2004) (holding that U.S. courts have jurisdiction
to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in
connection with hostilities and incarcerated at GuantAnamo Bay). Following the Rasul
decision, the Defense Department initiated a policy whereby GuantAnamo detainees could
challenge their status as enemy combatants (although without legal counsel) within
combatant status review panels. See John Mintz, PentagonSets Hearingsfor 595 Detainees,
WASH. POST, July 8, 2004, at A01. As of the time of these reports, 320 detainees have
appeared; there have been 104 determinations of which 103 have resulted in findings of
enemy combatancy; 150 other detainees who were once branded as dangerous terrorists by
the U.S. government have been sent back to their home countries. Neil A. Lewis,
Guantcnamo PrisonersGetting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2004);
Tim Golden, After Terror, a Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2004).
These status hearings differ from the planned prosecution in military commissions of a tiny
number of Guantinamo detainees for war crimes (these prosecutions face their own
independent challenges). Status hearings have been subject to criticism for failing to meet
the requirements of the Geneva Conventions. The government maintains that the proceeds
of torture, namely evidence obtained pursuant to torturing a detainee, is properly admissible
before a review panel in determining the status of the detainee. Associated Press,
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province of the executive to determine how to conduct affairs in
extraordinary times of war, even as regards the treatment of U.S. citizens.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided to wade into the fray with its
judgments in the Hamdi and Rasul cases, most strikingly with Justice
O'Connor's admonition in Hamdi that a state of war is not a blank check
for the President. With this in mind, the Court proceeded to grant detainees
at Guantinamo and U.S. citizen unlawful combatants held in military brigs
some access to public adjudication, at least to determine their status,
although the exact extent of that access remains somewhat ambiguous and
subject to subsequent and ongoing interpretation by the federal district
courts. By injecting some dissensus into the direction of the executive, the
Supreme Court played an important role in refining our response to the
terror threat, ensuring that the responses are proportionate, and showing that
dissensus can play a constructive role in combating terrorism and ensuring
that what we are fighting for is not lost in the process. Justice Scalia's
opinion in Hamdi (in which he was joined by Justice Stevens) was a
particularly powerful rebuke to the government's claim. Justice Scalia
maintained that any curtailment of civil rights during wartime must be done
openly and democratically, thereby reaffirming the importance of the duty
of adversarial justification.
The Supreme Court insisted that at least some of these important
conversations be kept in the public space, and that the government be called
to justify the impairments it makes to our freedoms in this war waged in the
name of freedom. In this vein, the Supreme Court may have served a useful
didactic function in instructing us about the false nature of the dichotomy
between dissensus and direction and then providing a constructive role for
mediating this important public debate. Over time, the availability of courts
as a forum in which these conversations can occur could help defuse
popular and often intransigent perceptions of these difficult issues.
Moreover, this is not just a U.S. phenomenon. In the United Kingdom,
courts that initially were diffident now have become somewhat more
welcoming of discussions regarding the breadth of governmental claims to
contain civil liberties and dissensus in the name of security and direction. 4
Democracies need to be particularly vigilant about the duty of
adversarial justification, and willing, as the Israeli Supreme Court put it, to
train to win with one hand tied behind their backs. After seeing the slippery
slope that quickly arose once physical force was permitted in official
questioning, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled in 1999 that "shaking suspects
and confining them in chairs tipped forward in painful positions for long
Government: Evidence gained by torture allowed (Dec. 8, 2004) (on file with the author).

Habeas petitions have been brought in federal court in favor of some of the detainees.
34 See,

e.g., G. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] EWCA Civ. 265

(permitting release on bail of a suspected international terrorist in light of a finding that his
mental illness was created by his extended indefinite detention).
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periods were violations of Israel's national and international commitments
against torture. 35 For Ignatieff, "liberal democratic regimes encourage a
kind of moral narcissism, a blinding belief that because this kind of society
authorizes such means, they must be acceptable. 36 He goes on to note that,
as a consequence of this moral narcissism, "democratic values . . . may

actually blind democratic agents to the moral reality of their actions. The
nobility of ends is no guarantee against resort to evil means; indeed, the
more noble they are, the more ruthlessness they can endorse., 37 The threat
occasioned by our narcissism is precisely why legalism-and its
companion, namely open adversarial review-is so important, and should
remain so, in the struggle against terrorism. Our responses to threats and
attacks can do more damage than the threats and attacks themselves. This
too, forms part of the calculus of the apocalyptic mind of the terrorist
agenda. We need to guard against it.
The White House is wise to realize that the terrorist threat does differ
from the state-based threats that, at least initially, grounded modem
international law.38 But this argument cuts both ways. On the one hand, it
suggests some basis to rescript traditional legal categories and blur the
differences between criminals and enemies, war and defense, armed attacks
and criminal attacks, and prisoners and detainees. On the other hand, this
is not a war in any classic sense. Normally, war ends with a surrender,
occupation, and dismantling of the opposing forces. This cannot happen in
the case of the war on terrorism. So, this war could become never-ending
or ending perhaps only when a greater threat emerges from somewhere else
to which we much respond.39 But that means that the changes to the law
that seem necessary in the name of extraordinary national security concerns
could very well and very easily become ordinary and, thereby, permanent.
This suggests our societies require and deserve the dissensus and discussion
that our governments may wish to avoid.
These concerns also suggest that criminal law approaches may merit
greater discussion.40 The criminal law, after all, permits the use of force to
track down, capture, and neutralize suspected criminals who resist arrest. It
also permits the use force in self-defense. This means that targeted
35 Ignatieff, supra note 25, at 10.
36 IGNATIEFF, supra note 26, at 119.
37

1d.

38 HALPER & CLARKE, supra note 1, at 32, 201.

That said, the U.S. did revert to the

traditional state-based model when it invaded Iraq, claiming inter alia Iraq's connections to
terrorism among the reasons justifying the invasion.
39 Id. at 3 ("war that has no dimensions, with elusive enemies who may be equally
residents of Damascus or Detroit and with no definition of what constitutes victory and thus
with no end in sight").
40 So too, might civil litigation involving terrorist financiers, against whom criminal
sanction also could be initiated.

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 36:335

assassinations of terrorists, a methodology used by certain states in the
struggle against terrorism, do not necessarily flow exclusively from the
armed conflict paradigm that has gained currency as the dominant response
to terrorism. In those places where there may be consensus in favor of
policies of targeted assassinations, one possibility is the initiation of judicial
processes (ordinary judicial actors acting in secret if necessary) to review
evidence ex ante and to issue warrants for targeted assassinations in
situations where the imminence of their threats can be proven as a matter of
self-defense, bearing in mind that the nature of the threat posed by terrorism
may suggest a broader level of flexibility in assessing imminence to
accommodate what might colloquially be called the "ticking time-bomb."
The point of this aside is not to pronounce normatively on the merits of the
criminal law paradigm or its marginalization but, rather, to underscore the
overlap between force and courts in the struggle against terrorism. There is
an overlap between the criminal law and armed conflict paradigms that
essentialized portrayals of either paradigm do not acknowledge,
accommodate, or permit.
Moreover, as Ignatieff observes, systemic human rights abuses can be
perpetrated by anyone in the name of any side to a conflict. 41 When
governments begin to suspend law in one context and for one purpose
(however limited), there may well be spill-over. It is difficult to contain the
abandonment of legalism to specific narrow contexts for which that
abandonment may initially have been contemplated. For example, methods
darkly used against unlawful enemy combatants-methods that themselves
pose serious challenges to international human rights and humanitarian
law 42-- quickly became transplanted to Iraq, where they were used against
prisoners of war, those innocents detained by mistake, those detained for
criminal activity (who mostly posed a rather limited security threat), and the
odd terrorist.43 Once governments go down the road of slicing away rule of
law by bending the rules on torture, they may hungrily continue to slice,
and ordinary individuals may internalize this hunger from above. In the
end, one might soon end up in a stygian place, and perhaps have gotten
supra note 26, at 118.
A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds DetaineeAbuse in Guantdnamo,N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30,

41 IGNATIEFF,
42 Neil

2004).
43 Isikoff, supra note 13 ("Administration critics have charged that key legal decisions
made in the months after September 11, 2001 including the White House's February 2002
declaration not to grant any Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters prisoners of war status under the
Geneva Convention, laid the groundwork for the interrogation abuses that have recently
been revealed in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq."); Tim Golden & Don Van Natta Jr., U.S.
Said to Overstate Value of Guantdnamo Detanees, N.Y. TIMEs, June 21, 2004, at Al
("Defense Department officials have acknowledged that American jailers in Iraq, under
pressure to produce better intelligence, adapted some new, more aggressive interrogation
techniques that were approved by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld for use at
Guantnamo.").
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there quite quickly. Abu Ghraib, along with reports emanating from
prisons in Afghanistan, are deeply disturbing reminders of that reality.
They also remind of Christopher Dawson's steadfast warning that "[a]s
soon as men decide that all means are permitted to fight an evil then their
good becomes indistinguishable from the evil that they set out to destroy.""
In the war on terror, the use of abuse and torture to some extent has
been sanitized under the guise of interrogation and intelligence-gathering.
Rendering an individual for interrogation or holding someone for
intelligence-gathering has bleached the more sinister reality of indefinite
detention and infliction of aggressive use of violence (psychological and
physical). After all, what value really can be had from the Guantdtnamo and
Afghan detainees: incarcerated, isolated for three years already, has any
information they might ever have had not become stale? Moreover,
although the Iraq conflict is a traditional state-to-state conflict to which the
Geneva Conventions unequivocally apply, there has been concerted effort
by the U.S. to carve out exceptions to the Conventions in terms of their
applicability to this theater of operations. 45 This further suggests that it is
difficult to dam suspensions of law just to one context; in fact, once
unleashed somewhere these suspensions may creep into different contexts
for which they are not justified, thereby eroding or corroding the overall
legal framework.
The falseness of the dichotomy between rights and security, which I
mentioned earlier as the third strawman dichotomy, now can be brought
home. The containment of law in the conflict in Iraq, and perhaps in the
war on terrorism generally, may well have exacerbated the terrorist threat.
Many observers suggest that the Abu Ghraib photos were the best terrorist
recruitment tool possible. Whether that is true or not, I don't know. But I
think it is fair to say that Abu Ghraib increased the risk that a greater
number of previously unmotivated individuals now feel motivated to lead a
life of terror. One Army report certainly thought these abuses were feeding
the insurgency by making gratuitous enemies.4 6 There is a link between
disrespecting rights and threatening national security. There are situations
where diligently respecting rights-in other words fighting with one hand
tied behind one's back-may in fact enhance one's ability to fight by
diminishing the will, appeal, frenzy, and recruitment of the enemy. What is
more, even subtle civil rights violations degrade the effectiveness of antiterrorism responses. For example, perceptions within law-abiding Arab44 CHRISTOPHER DAWSON, THE JUDGEMENT OF THE NATIONS 13 (1942).

45Douglas Jehl, U.S. Action Bars Right of Some Captured in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26,

2004) (reporting that a new legal opinion by the Bush Administration has concluded for the
first time that some non-Iraqi prisoners captured by American forces in Iraq are not entitled
to the protections of the Geneva Conventions).
46 Josh White, U.S. Generals in Iraq Were Told of Abuse Early, Inquiry Finds, WASH.
POST (Dec. 1, 2004).
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American communities of routine civil rights violations on the part of the
U.S. government have hampered intelligence gathering and the gatekeeping
function such communities can exercise over potential extremist elements.
Governmental heavy-handedness has generated fears within these
communities which, in turn, have induced a chilling effect that may well
have inhibited more individuals from coming forward with information. In
the end, this diminishes everyone's overall security.
In sum, calls by policymakers4 7 and academics 48 that governments
need to whittle down human rights in order to promote national security can
be alarmist and short-sighted. It is important to recognize reciprocity.
After all, if one government permits itself to rewrite the rules then everyone
else can do so, too. If the U.S. is free to disregard the terms of the Geneva
Conventions because of expediency, then so, too, is everyone else.
Unsurprisingly, one of the most powerful amicus briefs filed in support of
the Guantdnamo detainees in Rasul was written by some former American
prisoners of war.
I fear that abandoning the path of "lesser evil" may create a new type
of chaos in international relations. U.S. national security still depends in
large part on multilateral cooperation and the willingness of other nations to
conform their conduct to the requirements of international law. If we lose
what Robert Nye has called our soft power to convince other states to abide
by and enforce the law because we view that same law as a constraint, then
we are left only with hard power. In the seemingly multi-generational war
on terrorism carried out in multiple spheres of engagement, eventually the
deployment of this hard power may become too exhausting and too
overwhelming.

47

See, e.g., DAVID FRUM & RICHARD PERLE, AN END TO EVIL: HOW TO WIN THE WAR ON
TERROR (2003) (suggesting that, in the war on terror, the U.S. must be prepared to get tough

and dirty and recognize that foreign suspects should no longer be able to claim the same
rights before the law as U.S. citizens).
48 See, e.g., ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT,

RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE (2002) (suggesting that torture should be banned but, if the

U.S. relies on it, then Congress should regulate its use through applications to courts for
torture warrants).

